Federalist Paper #51

In his Federalist Paper 51, James Madison addresses the problem of how to maintain a balance of power in developing the government for the new nation of America. The first step, he emphasizes, is to accept the human dilemma: a desire for power and natural tendency for corruption. He then suggests two primary solutions which he goes on to explain in great detail. To maintain a balance of power in a government, it is necessary to have implement a system of checks and balances, and to hold repeated elections for the respective government positions of office.

The vernacular with which Madison delivers this argument astounds me. It is incredible how much time and energy he put into researching governments as thoroughly as possible. He wanted to be absolutely sure that our government would be created as one meant to last. It would need to be a government for the people, different from any system that had yet been established in any civilization. I love his observation that “If men were angels, no government would be necessary.” As this is definitely not the case, Madison then asserts that “You must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place, oblige it to control itself.” Primary control in this matter results from a dependence on the people, or the consent of the governed. The secondary control then becomes auxiliary precautions.

For a successful, balanced government, power must then be divided up and distributed. In order to accomplish this arduous task, it becomes necessary to use the fact that people desire power as an advantage. To preserve liberty, there must be separate and distinct exercise of different powers of government. Having thoroughly explained his argument, Madison then proceeds in this essay to suggest a system of government divided into three branches. The executive and legislative officials of their respective branches should be appointed by election. Judicial officials must be appointed by the executive powers, with the approval of the legislative body. Security against concentration of power in one department is accomplished by giving those administering in each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist the encroachments of the others. Thus, ambition is used to counteract ambition.

Judicial officials are appointed differently than executive and legislative, primarily because peculiar qualifications are essential due to the nature of the permanent tenure of the position. The most dangerous branch of the government is considered the legislative branch. This is because they have their hands in the pockets of the citizens, so to speak. In other words, their power to levy taxes makes it necessary to exert extra control upon this governmental branch. To accomplish this, Madison suggests dividing the legislature into two distinct governing bodies. These, of course, are the House of Representatives and the Senate. Frequent elections keep these officials on their toes and necessarily loyal and subject to the people.

Through these three separate branches of government set up as a system of checks and balances, Madison summarizes that “The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.” I also appreciate that he emphasizes the importance that “In a free government, the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights.” In reading and understanding this paper, I was amazed and so grateful at the incredible feat the Founding Fathers accomplished in setting up the government of this great nation. It is also little wonder to me why James Madison is known as the Father of the Constitution.